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PENGESAHAN KENDIRI PERJANJIAN KUNCI-AWAM MELALUI VOIP
MENGGUNAKAN SKIM RAWAK FUSION
ABSTRAK
Telefoni Internet, yang dikenali juga sebagai Suara melalui Protokol Internet (VoIP),
menjadi salah satu alternatif telekomunikasi yang popular disebabkan penggunaan Internet
yang semakin meluas. Internet memperkaya cara sistem telefoni digunakan, tetapi dalam
masa yang sama menimbulkan pelbagai kebimbangan, terutamanya keselamatan. Tidak
seperti telefon konvensional, pencuri-dengar komunikasi Internet boleh dilaksanakan secara
maya tanpa memerlukan sebarang akses fizikal. Isu ini memberi peluang yang lebih besar
kepada musuh untuk mengeksploitasi privasi komunikasi Internet. Kerana itu, penyulitan te-
lah digunakan untuk melawan tindakan yang merugikan ini. Selain itu, perundingan kunci,
yang merupakan asas dalam penyulitan, mesti diselamatkan untuk menghindarkan ancaman
yang dikenali sebagai serangan orang-di-tengah (MITM). Namun begitu, perundingan kunci
yang selamat seperti Infrastruktur Kunci-Awam (PKI) tipikalnya melibatkan pihak ketiga
yang dipercayai (TTP) untuk mengesahkan kunci awam, yang menuntut kos atas perkhi-
dmatan yang diberikannya. Tesis ini membentangkan satu mekanisme pengesahan alternatif
untuk kunci awam melalui komunikasi VoIP. Alternatif ini dirancang untuk mewujudkan
sebuah perjanjian kunci yang boleh dipercayai tanpa kehadiran TTP pada sesi panggilan
antara dua peserta yang telah mengenali antara satu sama lain terlebih dahulu. Satu skim
pengesahan baru diperkenalkan sebagai Skim Rawak Fusion (RFS) yang mengambil kele-
bihan dari komunikasi telefon dimana interaksi masa nyata dan kecerdasan manusia dapat
dioptimumkan secara fleksible semasa sesi telefon. RFS memasukkan ‘cap jari’ (nilai cin-
cangan) kunci awam di dalam aliran suara peserta. Satu teknik untuk mengekstrak ‘cap
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jari’ ditakrifkan dalam RFS yang dicadangkan menggunakan algoritma-algoritma pencari-
an corak dan rentetan sepadan. Sebuah kerangka kerja hibrid kemudian dicadangkan yang
menggunakan RFS pada perjanjian kunci Lengkungan Eliptik Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), yang
kemudian dirujuk sebagai kerangka kerja ECDH-RFS. Kerangka kerja yang dicadangkan
mengesahkan kunci awam secara automatik sebagai satu kunci yang sah jika suara peserta
membawa ‘cap jari’ yang setanding dengan kunci awam yang diterbitkan. Akhirnya, ke-
rangka kerja ini memberikan kesukaran yang besar kepada penyerang untuk mengganggu
penukaran kunci awam. Oleh kerana itu, kerangka kerja menyediakan integriti kunci awam
yang mantap. Akibatnya, sebarang percubaan memalsukan kunci awam sama ada akan
menyebabkan penolakan terhadap pertukaran kunci atau merosakkan komunikasi itu sendiri
yang mana menggerakkan penggera kepada peserta. Keputusan uji kaji menunjukkan kae-
dah yang dicadangkan telah melakukan pengesahan yang munasabah dalam masa 5 hingga
60 saat perbualan dengan overhed yang marginal. Selain itu, analisis keselamatan telah
membuktikan bahawa kerangka kerja yang dicadangkan dapat mengesan dan mengelakk-
an percubaan-percubaan dalam serangan MITM. Penyelidikan ini menghapuskan peranan
orang ketiga dalam keselamatan VoIP, dengan itu membantu mengurangi kos dan kerumit-
an dalam pengurusan sistem VoIP. Tambahan pula, cadangan kerja ini hanya memerlukan
fungsi asas komunikasi telefon yang menjadikannya mungkin dilaksanakan dalam pelbagai
keadaan, dengan atau tanpa adanya sokongan visual.
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SELF-VERIFICATION OF PUBLIC-KEY AGREEMENT OVER VOIP USING
RANDOM FUSION SCHEME
ABSTRACT
Internet telephony, also known as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), has become one
of popular alternatives in telecommunication due to the widespread of the Internet usage.
The Internet enriches the way of telephony system is used, but in the meantime it elevates
many concerns, particularly security. Unlike the conventional telephone, tapping the Inter-
net communication is feasibly done virtually without requiring any physical access. This
issue gives a greater opportunity for the adversaries to exploit the communication privacy.
Hence, encryption has been utilised to combat such adverse acts. Besides, the key nego-
tiation, which is the cornerstone for encryptions, must be secured to avert a threat known
as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. However, a secure key negotiation like Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI) typically entails trusted third party (TTP) for public key verification,
which demands costs in its service. This thesis presents an alternative verification for pub-
lic key over VoIP communication. The alternative is designed to establish a trustworthy
key agreement without the presence of TTP on the call session between two participants
who have known each other in advance. A new verification scheme is introduced as
Random Fusion Scheme (RFS) that takes advantages of telephone communications where
real-time interaction and human intelligence can flexibly be optimised during the session.
RFS inserts the public key’s fingerprint (hash value) within the participants’ voice stream.
A technique to extract the fingerprint is defined in RFS using pattern searching and string
matching algorithms. A hybrid framework is proposed that employs RFS on Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, which is then referred as ECDH-RFS framework.
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The proposed framework automatically verifies a public key as authentic if the partici-
pant’s voice carries a comparable fingerprint as the published public key. Eventually, this
framework gives a great difficulty for an attacker to interfere with the exchange of the
public key. Therefore, the framework provides a robust public key integrity. Consequently,
any attempt on forging the public key will either result in rejecting the key exchange or
damaging the communication itself which raises an alarm to the participants. The ex-
perimental results show the proposed framework has performed a reasonable verification
within 5 to 60 seconds of conversation with marginal overhead. Moreover, the security
analysis has proved that the proposed framework could detect and avert attempts in MITM
attack. This research excludes third party role in VoIP security, thus helps reducing cost
and complexity in managing VoIP systems. Furthermore, the proposed work only requires
the basic functionality of telephone communication that makes the application is feasible




Alternative telephone services over the Internet, known as Internet telephony, has started
gaining popularity over the conventional telephone services, e.g. Skype and WhatsApp. The
increasing demand of this Internet service is triggered by the remarkable benefits offered
such as low-cost, portability, and enriched functionality (Karapantazis and Pavlidou, 2009).
The development of this telephony service is highly promising and foreseen to overtake
the majority of telephony systems in the course of time (Conti, 2005).
Internet telephony, principally known as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), resembles
telephone functionality in many ways, especially digital telephones. The fundamental net-
working technology behinds VoIP system is based on the Internet Protocol (IP) network,
which is a packet switching system. As the Internet is reaching an ubiquity, convergence
between the two switching systems is highly anticipated as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The
interoperability can be made by utilising a networking tool that is capable for adapting
telephone signals and channelling the communication data across diverse networking sys-
tems, VoIP gateway for instance. The gateway connects the Internet backbone with the
public switched telephone network (PSTN) and private branch exchange (PBX).
The development of this interoperability ecosystem has attracted many attentions up to
the enterprise levels. However, VoIP adaptation has been encoutering quality of service
(QoS) issues, because of the nature of the underlying network. Data sent in packets
through the IP network are subject to experience transmission problems such as loss and
delay that occur due to many factors, including software, hardware, and network. As a
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Figure 1.1: Interoperability telephone ecosystems
result, perceivable disruptions easily transpire during VoIP calls when these problems are
excessive. These disruptions have become the major obstacles in VoIP adaptation and may
affect the overall reliability of the ecosystem.
In recent times, the QoS of VoIP systems has shown a positive progress due to the
advancement of software, hardware, and network technologies. In contrary, the security
issues have become a greater challenge along the rapid growth of Internet services and its
users. Many works including Butcher et al. (2007), Karapantazis and Pavlidou (2009), and
Keromytis (2011) have reviewed that relying on IP networks, mainly the Internet, makes
VoIP system more vulnerable to security threats.
1.1 Security Threats
Potential threats in VoIP systems are classifiable based on VoIP threat taxonomy proposed
by VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) (Endler et al., 2005). The classification is concentrated
on the trend of research publications in VoIP security. The classification divides VoIP
threats into four major types: social threat, service abuse, denial-of-service (DoS), and
traffic attack. Social threat covers misrepresentation acts and unsolicited calls. This type
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of threat misleads users through scam, spam, and phishing. In VoIP systems, the attempts
are correspondingly known as impersonation, spam over Internet telephony (SPIT), and
voice phishing (Vishing). Secondly, service abuse attempts to use VoIP service in improper
manners such as committing frauds and trespassing services. Thirdly, DoS is one of the
most common threats in the Internet aiming to fail or interrupt the services. Lastly,
traffic attack is vulnerable to most services that communicate through public networks.
The attempts of the attack include eavesdropping, interception, and modification on the
communication traffic.
In telephony, traffic attack has been noted as one of prominent risks that conceivable by
third parties. Traffic attack is accomplished through wiretapping as schemed on Figure 1.2.
In circuit-switched networks, it is difficult to wiretap the communication without a lawful
access to its physical line or device (Sicker and Lookabaugh, 2004). Thus, it minimises
possibilities of the attack from the adversaries. However, risks of traffic attack on IP
networks are multiplied since security penetration tools readily available on the Internet.
The adversaries can perform remote observation (passive attack) and manipulation (active
attack) on the IP packets by modifying the path or implanting bug (malware) on vital
points in the communication channel.
Figure 1.2: Typical wiretapping schemes
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These exploitation acts are jeopardizing the primary aspects of information security,
particularly confidentiality and integrity (Butcher et al., 2007). Although eradicating the
acts is not likely, adding encryption helps prevent the adversaries to learn or alter the
original content in the communication. Therefore, encryption has been noted as the the
major solution to preserve confidentiality and integrity in VoIP communication as suggested
by Dantu et al. (2009) and Son et al. (2012).
Encryption is the elementary method in cryptography to provide confidentiality or
privacy of information that is exchanged through a public network. Encryptions require
a single key, at least, to accomplish. Without the key, the users are neither able to
encrypt nor decrypt information. Thus, the users need to share or agree on the key. The
easiest method is by sending the key through the same channel beforehand. Nevertheless,
this method paves an opportunity for adversaries to duplicate the key, which causes the
ciphertext being compromised. Therefore, confidentially of the key is also very crucial
prior to the creation of a secure transaction using an encryption.
In the regard of key confidentiality, among the notable cryptographic protocols for key
agreement, such as Diffie-Hellman (DH) by Diffie and Hellman (1976), and Public-Key
Cryptography (PKC), Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) by Rivest et al. (1978), are applied
to resolve the matter using the concept of asymmetric cryptography. These protocols have
been widely used as the foundation on many security systems, including in VoIP security
such as Zimmermann et al. (2011), Zisiadis et al. (2008), and Wang and Liu (2010).
However, the protocols are neglecting the public key’s owner that makes the authenticity
issue remaining unresolved (Trappe and Washington, 2005). Furthermore, this issue creates
a possibility for adversary to hijack in the middle of secure channel unknowingly which
is further identified as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.
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MITM attack has been the greatest hindrance to accomplish a secure channel. MITM
attack can impact the secure channel losing over its identity control and encryption (Zisiadis
et al., 2008). MITM attack involves both passive and active traffic attacks by making the
legitimate users believe that their communication is direct without any interference. In
asymmetric-key cryptosystems, the adversary intercepts the public keys from the legitimate
users and then presents the adversary’s public key on behalf to succeed the attack. In
order to prevent this attempt, the public key has to be verified and accountable.
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been widely trusted to perform public key veri-
fication on many electronic commerce services such as e-shopping and e-banking. PKI
distributes digital certificates that firmly bind the public key with the identity of its owner.
PKI uses digital signature to verify the authenticity of public key, thus provides account-
ability and integrity aspects to the negotiation. Nevertheless, unless a trusted third party
(TTP) is present in PKI, a digital certificate is difficult to confirm that could lead to the
occurrence of MITM attack (Aghila and Chandirasekaran, 2011).
1.2 Problem Statement
The role of TTP in PKI is very important to achieve a reliable verification. However, TTP
comes with certain prices such as service and certificate management (Ellison and Schneier,
2000; Gutmann, 2002). As an alternative, approaches such as Zimmermann Real-time
Transport Protocol (ZRTP) by Zimmermann et al. (2011) and Voice Interactive Personalized
Security (VIPSec) by Zisiadis et al. (2008) have introduced innovative mechanisms to verify
the key agreement which is dedicated for VoIP. The verification is conducted in a verbal
manner by comparing the verification code throughout the call session. This verification
has been shown to be able in verifying the public key manually without involving any TTP
through VoIP calls. Nevertheless, these approaches consumes indecisive time in confirming
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the code mutually. Furthermore, ignoring this phase gives an opportunity for the adversary
to successfully execute MITM attack (Petraschek et al., 2008).
This thesis proposes an alternative public key verification approach amid the afore-
mentioned problem of verbal verification. The proposed approach is designed to achieve
a self-verification on public-key agreement throughout VoIP call sessions without requir-
ing any TTP and manual intervention from the users. The approach utilises well-known
cryptographic tools that include key agreement, hash function, and pseudorandom gen-
eration. Furthermore, the approach makes use of the common properties in telephone
communications, namely the real-time interaction and human intelligence.
A new verification scheme is introduced as Random Fusion Scheme (RFS). RFS is
defined as a process to fuse a string on voice stream. The string serves as the verifi-
cation code in the form of public key’s fingerprint, the product of a cryptographic hash
function. The main goal is identical to verbal verification, which is to prevent adversaries
from replacing or falsifying public key as practiced by MITM attack, hence the integrity
and accountability of the public key are preserved. Afterwards, a hybrid framework is
synthesised by cooperating RFS with a light-weight variant of DH key agreement, Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which is then referred as ECDH-RFS. The final stage of
the hybrid framework produces a shared session key securely from the self-verified public
key, which can be used for establishing a secure session.
1.3 Objectives
The main objectives of this research are specified as follows:
1. To propose a verification scheme that exchanges verification code through voice
stream.
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2. To develop a hybrid framework that verifies public key without assuming PKI and
TTP by implementing the proposed verification scheme on DH key agreement.
3. To evaluate the complexity and reliability of the proposed verification scheme and
analyse the overall cost and security of the hybrid framework, especially against
MITM attack.
1.4 Scope of the Study
The scope of this study, as presented in Figure 1.3, is within the field of applied cryptog-
raphy on VoIP system. The main goal of the research is to provide a reliable public key
verification that can protect the integrity of a public key. The integrity of public keys is
one of the most important security aspects to avert a harmful threat like MITM attack that
tries to intercept and falsify the public key during its negotiation. Hence, encryptions can
be securely established by employing the verified public key.
The basic concepts in cryptography and VoIP system are studied to build a firm
research foundation. This study also reviews the common security threats that endanger
VoIP communication and the existing preventive mechanisms. Besides, the study covers
several verification approaches typically employed to confirm authenticity of the public key
including PKI, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), identity-based cryptography, and other related
methods, particularly practicable for VoIP security. Moreover, the study concentrates on
verbal verification, which is dedicated for VoIP communications. The study also includes
the feasibility of steganography, specifically using voice, to support verification as intended
in the proposed verification scheme.
The proposed research work is motivated by the capability of verbal verification to ex-
clude the involvement of TTP on the public key verification by using the native character-
7
Figure 1.3: Summary of the scope in the research
istics in telephone communications, including real-time interaction and human intelligence.
The verbal verification method is only effective to solve issues within the scope of the
regular telephone communications where both participants, a caller (who initiates the call)
and a callee (who receives the call), are able to recognise and confirm each other identity
through voice. Meanwhile, ensuring the truthfulness of the participants is not technically
addressed in the scope of verbal verification. Therefore, irregularity cases such as fraud
and scam that occur during the communications are considered as beyond the scope of
problem solving.
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1.5 Contributions of the Research
The research contributes to the area of public key verification for VoIP security. The
contributions are broadly divided into two modules which summarised as follows:
1. Random Fusion Scheme (RFS)
(a) The proposed verification scheme abbreviated as RFS is based on keyless
steganography that transports verification code over real-time voice.
(b) Two core techniques are defined, namely fusing and defusing.
i. Fusing is the technique to conceal a string on voice stream randomly.
ii. Defusing is the technique to discover the concealed string in voice stream
utilising the chosen pattern searching and string matching algorithms.
2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and RFS hybridisation
(a) A hybrid framework, ECDH-RFS, is developed for public key verification.
(b) The framework includes some exceptional features:
i. Self-verification, the main verbal verification feature that removes indepen-
dency of the public key verification from relying the service of TTP.
ii. Automatic integrity check, the framework eliminates any manual interven-
tion from the users during the verification.
iii. Low-cost, the framework only entails voice communication and the min-
imum computing specification for standard cryptographic systems such as
pseudorandom, hashing, and key agreement.
iv. MITM sensibility, MITM attack is sensed and immobilised by binding the
public key’s fingerprint with the participant’s voice, thus the public key is
improbable to be forged.
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1.6 Research Methodology
The flow chart diagram in Figure 1.4 shows the summary activities carried out during the
research study. The research consists of four chief phases: preliminary phase, modelling
phase, prototyping phase, and experimental phase. Preliminary phase implicates problem
definition and literature review in the research study. The literature review is crucial to
support clarifying the research problem and achieving the research objectives. Upon the
completion of the preliminary phase, the criteria had been defined to envision in preparing
the design of the proposed scheme.
Figure 1.4: Research activities flow
10
Modelling phase defines the proposed verification scheme, RFS, in detail. RFS is
designed based on voice steganography. In typical steganographic methods, there are two
main techniques necessary for concealing the secret and revealing the secret back, which
correspondingly referred as fusing and defusing in RFS. These techniques are realised
and subsequently examined. The first objective is achieved in this phase if the desired
outcome has been reached. Afterwards, the hybrid framework, ECDH-RFS, is modelled
and prototyped to verify if the envisioned criteria are achievable.
In prototyping phase, a VoIP testbed is prepared for the implementation of ECDH-RFS.
Table 1.1 lists the hardware requirements for the setup. The testbed is configured in a
simple star topology network to attain a steady circumstance as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
This setup is configured to allow a full control over parameters and variables, principally
for the experimental purposes. Besides, a minimised setup gets rid of any foreign factors
that can interfere with the experiments, thus dependable results can be expected.
Table 1.1: Hardware requirements
Hardware (Quantity) Function
Computers (4) VoIP server / VoIP user / Adversary
Recording & Playback devices (2) Capture and play user’s voice on user’s machine
Ethernet Cable Connect the devices on wired environment
Switch (1) Link the computer devices
Figure 1.5: The network configuration
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On software perspective, VoIP users communicate through the client application, also
known as software phone (softphone). In the testbed, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-
based softphone, called Jitsi, is adapted and installed on the users’ machine. The main
reasons for choosing Jitsi because Jitsi is an open source softphone with built-in security
features including Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) and ZRTP. Besides, Jitsi
is running on Java platform, thus it is portable on various OS. The design specifications
for the testbed are listed in Table 1.2. The main task in this phase is to develop the
hybrid framework and achieve the second ojective. The framework is integrated with the
configured VoIP client to serve as the testing protoype.
Table 1.2: Design specifications
Software Name Usage
Linux OS on VoIP server
Windows OS on VoIP users
Jitsi VoIP client
OpenSIPS Open source SIP server
Java Software development platform
Java Media Framework (JMF) Library for enabling media applications on Java platform
Bouncy Castle Java cryptography API
Eclipse IDE for Java software development
Several experiments and analyses are conducted to evaluate the proposed verification
scheme and the hybrid framework as well as to achieve the last objective. The proposed
verification scheme, RFS, is analysed in terms of run-time and space complexities on
its techniques. In the experiment, fixed test vectors are used and certain variables are
varied in order to prove hypotheses by observing its effect towards the results. This
experimental analysis confirms the applicability level of the proposed verification scheme
on the deployed machine.
Moreover, security analysis is executed to verify that the hybrid framework, ECDH-
RFS, is provably secure, especially against MITM attack. The analysis clarifies the defen-
12
sive method of the framework in dealing with the threat. Furthermore, the performance of
the testing prototype is analysed and discussed. This experiment attests the reliability of
the framework on an actual scenario of VoIP call by intentionally creating disruption dur-
ing the call session. The analysis shows the dependability of the framework and indicates
its limit to cope with such case. Eventually, the research is concluded after the objectives
have been accomplished.
1.7 Thesis Organisation
The organisation of this thesis is arranged to facilitate a broad range of readers, either
inside or outside the research field. The research presented involves a multidisciplinary
knowledge within the domain of VoIP security and applied cryptography. In this chapter,
the general overview of the research including problem statement, objectives, contributions,
and research methodology is introduced. Chapter 2 reviews the fundamental research
backgrounds in the domain. Besides, related public key verification approaches and VoIP
steganography are studied as well. Chapter 3 defines the proposed verification scheme and
its implementation on a cryptographic key agreement. In Chapter 4, the complexity and
reliability of the proposed verification scheme are analysed and experimentally tested. The
computational and storage cost of the hybrid framework is calculated and security analysis
is discussed. Finally, the conclusion and the promising directions for the forthcoming




The emergence of cheaper technology and communication alternatives naturally attracts
more users and malicious activities (Symantec, 2015). Hence, the landscape of potential
security threats in the Internet has been continually evolving since then. As the consequence
of being part of the Internet family, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems are
facing similar security risks. In order to design a reliable public key verification for
VoIP security, this chapter reviews fundamental components in VoIP system and its major
security concerns, especially on the communications. Besides, foundation in cryptography
and well-known cryptosystems are investigated. Furthermore, several related public key
verification methods and VoIP steganography are reviewed.
2.1 Voice over IP System
VoIP system provides an alternative telephony system over Internet Protocol (IP) networks
such as local area network (LAN), intranet, and the Internet, which is termed specifically
as Internet telephony. In general, IP networks are based on packet switching system that
operates differently from conventional telephone networks. As demonstrated on Figure 2.1,
a full-duplex in conventional telephones session is established using a circuit switching
system. The telephone exchanges (switches) arrange a single channel every time a session
is wanted. This channel is fixed and the bandwidth is fully dedicated for tranmitting voice
signals throughout the session. In contrary, packet switching system is connectionless
intrinsically. Each packet from a source is individually addressed to the destination over
various routes based on the packet’s information and the router’s decision. The routes
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Figure 2.1: General concept of packet and circuit switching systems
are shared with several users for more than a telephone line. Hence, scenarios including
packet loss, misallocated, delay, and traffic jam (bottleneck) are usual incurrences on packet
switching systems.
These incurrences, especially packet loss and delay, cause quality degradations such as
jitters, noises, and echoes, which can disrupt the communication (James et al., 2004). The
issue of quality is one of the challenges in VoIP expansions. For many years, conventional
telephones sustain a better quality of service (QoS) on both traditional analog and modern
digital telephones, which has caused the lack of acceptance to VoIP technology at the
beginning. Nevertheless, the recent VoIP quality has been significantly improved due to
the presence of higher speed network and computing performance.
In order to construct a VoIP system, components such as server, client, protocol, and
codec are commonly required as depicted in Figure 2.2. In communication systems, pro-
tocol is important to allow the communicating resources to work properly as intended. In
telephony systems, there are two indispensable types of protocol to establish a call session
between two participants or more as in a conference call, which include signaling and
media transport. These protocols are specified in the application layer of the Transmission
Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.2: VoIP common requirements
Signaling protocol is responsible for controlling telephone sessions such as establish-
ment, teardown, and transfer of the calls. The standards in signaling protocol are divided
into two groups. The first group defines general signaling procedure for VoIP systems.
Whereas, the second group, known as gateway signaling, is specifically to manage inte-
gration of VoIP systems with other telephony systems by translating signals or packets
between the systems. The first group of signaling protocols serves as the core element
in telephony systems for managing telephone sessions. In public switched telephone net-
work (PSTN), signaling protocol like Signalling System No. 7 (SS7) is implemented and
industrialised by telecommunications company in worldwide. In VoIP systems, standards
such as Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) (Rosenberg et al., 2002), H.323 (ITU-T, 2009),
and Jingle (Ludwig et al., 2016) are similarly employed to manage the signaling systems.
These standards intend to handle the same case using different procedures.
Figure 2.3: Encapsulation of VoIP protocols in TCP/IP model
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Comparing the standards is rather difficult as these standards are continually revised.
According to the development timeline, H.323 protocol was introduced much earlier than
SIP and Jingle. H.323 was leading as the standard implementation for VoIP systems.
However, H.323 is heavily based on SS7 that designated for PSTN, which makes the
protocol harder to configure without a sufficient knowledge or an expert assistances (Goode,
2002). Early comparison by Rosenberg and Schulzrinne (1998) has stated that SIP provides
higher extensibility with lower complexity than H.323. The rationale behind the argument
is the procedures in H.323 are defined specifically to carry out the respective tasks, thus
makes H.323 less flexible for the improvements (Basicevic et al., 2008). In addition,
Jingle is developed as the signaling mechanism for Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP), formerly called as Jabber, which is successfully deployed on Google
Talk (Saint-Andre, 2007). Jingle protocol is released later after H.323 and SIP. Hence,
Jingle is considered at younger phase of development compared to SIP and H.323.
In the current development, SIP and Jingle are considered as the most potential sig-
naling protocols for the future of the Internet applications. Jingle is based on Extensible
Markup Language (XML) that is highly readable. Hence, Jingle is practicable to be
communicated over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)-based applications which are very
familiar for the Internet users. Similarly, the elements in SIP have a comparable design
as in HTTP. However, SIP works independently, instead of operating on top of another
protocol like Jingle. This independency makes SIP simpler and easier to be detached from
the overlying protocols. Therefore, SIP has drawn more attentions, especially for its future
implementations (Liu and Mouchtaris, 2000).
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2.1.1 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
SIP is initially designed for signaling and controlling multimedia communications on IP
networks. According to Goode (2002) and Glasmann et al. (2003), SIP aims a high
flexibility in the first place, thus evolutions or enhancements can be easily adapted. This
attribute is indeed essential, especially due to the rapid development of the Internet systems.
The most notable example is the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) framework that employs
SIP as the main protocol to manage and integrate several multimedia services, including
VoIP system and IP television (IPTV).
SIP is operable within various transport layers. Normally, SIP performs a reliable
handshake using the connection-oriented protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) to ensure the signaling is carried out properly. The implementation is adjustable for
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for some reasons, including speeding up tasks, reducing
overloads, and improving scalability (Rosenberg and Schulzrinne, 1998). Figure 2.4 shows
the overall of the SIP handshakes during active SIP sessions. As illustrated, the SIP server
is a middle party that bridges between two VoIP participants. The server requires client
to register at the beginning in order for the clients to attain the authority in accessing the
service. In the Internet services, it is usual custom for the users to move over devices and
change IP address. Hence, the registration recurrently occurs to update the users’ address
at a time. The user is required to present the current address to initiate the registration.
Subsequently, the server usually challenges the users on their authorisations. The users are
able to engage in VoIP sessions whenever the registration is successful.
Typically, there are three main consecutive states in a SIP call session: session estab-
lishment, session online, and session teardown. Throughout the establishment, the caller
initiates the call using an INVITE message. The caller simply appends the server’s name
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Figure 2.4: The handshakes on SIP sessions (Rosenberg et al., 2002)
on behalf of the callee’s address and sends it to the server. The server assists the process
of finding and connecting the caller with the callee. The server replies with either success-
ful or failure response. In a successful request, the server forwards the INVITE message
to the callee. The callee then responds with a 180 RINGING message. Finally, if the call
is answered, the callee notifies the caller with a 200 OK message.
After the call is agreed (session online), the participants perform a direct real-time
communication using the media transport protocol that is described in the next subsection.
In order to terminate the session (session teardown), the initiator needs to send a BYE
message to other participant and then close the media path. When the BYE message is
received, the receiver replies a 200 OK message and close the path as well. Additionally,
a session transfer is feasibly done during an online session when the users would like to
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handover the session on different address. In this situation, the initiator has to inform the
associated call partner using a REFER message that contains a new designated address.
The associated participant then performs similar handshakes on session establishment to
the new address and session teardown to the old address.
In terms of network infrastructure, SIP consists of some important elements such as
user agent (UA), registrar, location service, redirect server, and proxy server. UA is a
logical endpoint in SIP that is able to construct the SIP messages. In Figure 2.4, Alice
and Bob act as the UA client (UAC) and sipser.org as the UA server (UAS). In
details, registrar is a UAS that specifically handles registration process. It associates with
a database known as location service to track the users’ location. In order to locate the
users, redirect server is a UAS that is used to enquiry the users’ address from location
service. Lastly, proxy server is an intermediary entity server that capable to act on behalf
of both UAs. These elements can be distributed physically as long as the elements are
working logically. The distributed infrastructure intends to enhance concurrencies, reduce
loads, and avoid single point of failure (SPOF).
Figure 2.5 illustrates the events in Figure 2.4 and the roles of each UA. Each valid
request or response message that is originated from UA may not be addressed directly.
The messages may passed through proxy servers. The UAS and proxy servers are oper-
ated based on its configured behaviour, in either stateful (TCP-like) or stateless (UDP-like)
modes. As illustrated, redirect server is configured in stateless mode. This configuration
helps speed up in passing and responding any queries to location service without ques-
tioning ACK. Therefore, stateless mode is supportive for distributed systems, mainly to
accelerate communications among the UAS that have a reliable connection.
Initially, SIP applies a client-server model, but then a considerable success of peer-to-
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Figure 2.5: The SIP elements (Rosenberg et al. (2002))
peer (P2P) VoIP system like Skype has given an inspiration. As similarly intended, Singh
and Schulzrinne (2005) has made the P2P model available for SIP as well. The model
setups and distributes multiple nodes within the network in order to determine the best
path for communication. The model improves reliability and scalability of the system.
Despite the advantages of P2P model, the model increases security risks as the packets
traverse through many nodes and routes (Seedorf, 2006).
SIP defines security mechanisms such as Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Exten-
sions (S/MIME) and HTTP digest authentication. S/MIME by Ramsdell and Turner (2010)
is adaptable in SIP to prevent modification on SIP messages during the transmissions.
In addition, S/MIME can also be used to distribute digital certificates. S/MIME aims to
achieve integrity and confidentiality of the MIME bodies or the whole body of a SIP mes-
sage (Salsano et al., 2002). However, S/MIME does not provide a replay attack protection
as the MIME bodies do not maintain any state (Gupta and Shmatikov, 2007).
HTTP digest authentication by Franks et al. (1999) is mainly used for authorising the
user access to the SIP server. A mutual authentication between UAC and UAS takes
place typically using a password-based authentication system. HTTP digest authentication
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avoids the users to send a plain password. As the replacement, the user exchanges
digested value of the credential and combines it with a one-time randomly generated value
by the server (nonce). Nevertheless, HTTP digest authentication is not highly secured
as it requires password negotiation beforehand (Salsano et al., 2002). The flaw of this
mechanism can be exposed if the adversary deduces the secret during its negotiation or
through comparisons of the digested values. Furthermore, this authentication is defenseless
against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack (Asokan et al., 2005).
Moreover, SIP can employ external security protocols to attain a higher security. The
protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) by Dierks and Rescorla (2008) and
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) by Kent and Seo (2005) are engaged to encrypt the
communication channel between endpoints. The users have to signify the desire of us-
ing TLS by replacing “sip” with “sips” in the SIP messages similarly as HTTP Secure
(HTTPS). Whereas, IPSec aims to establish a secure tunnel for all passing IP packets.
However, IPSec requires manual pre-configuration on the desired endpoints, thus makes
IPSec less convenient, especially when the users need to change to another address or
device (El Sawda and Urien, 2006).
2.1.2 Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
Transmitting real-time speech distinguishes VoIP from other Internet services. As defined
by (Schulzrinne et al., 2003), Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is a standard commu-
nication format for real-time media delivery in IP networks, especially speech and video.
RTP is capable of transmitting data in unicast (to a single address) or multicast (to a group
of addresses). RTP is encapsulated on UDP to afford a real-time continuous transmission.
As consequence, RTP is neither able to ensure on-time delivery nor guarantee its quality.
In order to address some quality issues, RTP optionally engages the RTCP that works
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in parallel (out-of-band) to collect statistics and provide report on the quality of an RTP
stream. This report can be used for discovering any transmission faults.
In terms of security, RTP shares the same liability as its underlying protocol. RTP
does not comprehensively address the mechanism for its security. Instead, it relies on other
implementations to resolve the matter. For instance, preserving the confidentially of the
RTP packets is achievable through encryption using the proposed security protocols such
as Secure RTP (SRTP), TLS, and IPSec.
The RTP payload carries the most essential data for VoIP systems and multimedia
systems that employ RTP. It contains digital speech or video that has been adjusted for its
transmission. The adjustment is managed through the codec. The type of codec used in
the RTP sessions is defined on Payload Type (PT) field in the header. However, PT binds
the codec to a session in a static way (Handley et al., 2006). Hence, description protocols
such as Session Description Protocol (SDP) is employed on RTP to provide dynamic codec
binding (Camarillo and Schulzrinne, 2010). In addition, SDP is also contained in signaling
protocols such as SIP. This protocol allows changes on the codec or its attributes, i.e.
clock rate and frame size, dynamically during the session. Furthermore, SDP is able to
support joining multiple streams and synchronising codecs within a session.
2.1.3 Speech Codecs
The conversion between analog and digital often produces a heavy raw data. Thus, codec
is required to transform digital data in a lighter format, mainly to ease data transmission.
There are many types of codec used for VoIP call sessions. Each codec processes data
differently and produces various quality and size, which can be a burden for outdated
device or limited network bandwidth capacity. Hence, choosing a codec takes a serious
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consideration between the needs and capabilities. Basically, codecs are a work of digital
data compression that is run in the form of hardware device or software program. The
compressions are common for audio, video, and text.
Codecs include process of encoding (compression) and decoding (decompression).
Based on the compression results, a codec can be lossless or lossy. Lossless codecs
intend to preserve the equivalent quality as the original data, which can be expensive
for storage. Alternatively, lossy codecs degrade the original quality of the data to im-
prove compression rate and produce lighter data. The quality loss in the results of lossy
compressions should be imperceptible to human. Otherwise, the codec is not eligible for
transparency, which is one of the ideal aspects in lossy compressions.
In VoIP systems, codec is one of the crucial aspects that determine the quality in
the call sessions. Codec handles the digital data before and after the transmission of the
RTP packets. Figure 2.6 demonstrates the flow of one-way speech transmission on RTP.
Firstly, the speech is captured by a recording device, viz. microphone, in the format of
analog signal. The analog signal is then converted into digital signal using analog-to-
digital converter (ADC). This process is also known as digitisation. In analog telephones,
digitisation is not required as the signals are exchanged in analog circumstance.
Figure 2.6: One-way speech transmission on RTP (adapted from Soares et al. (2008))
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